To: Special Committee on Electoral Reform, Yukon.

Dear Special Committee on Electoral Reform Members:

Re: Dave Brekke's Alternate Proposal for Electoral Reform 2022-01-22 Preferential Ridings Proportional (PRP) system

We are submitting Dave Brekke's Proposal as a team who have been helping and learning from Mr. Brekke and the wider Fair Vote Yukon group since 2012.

The submission is divided into three parts to make it more accessible.

Part 1: A Case for Inclusion – To begin, simplify the Choice. Please see our attached letter below: 2022-01-25 group letter to Special Committee on Electoral Reform with How I Became Concerned About Canada's Electoral System. Two attachments.

Part 2: Election Results Comparison of present First-Past-The-Post system and the proposed Preferential-Ridings-Proportional system. Two attachments.

Part 3: How we could start change, experiment and improve our system: COLLABORATION: The Key to Better Governance and the BALLOT that can help make it happen. One attachment.

Dave Brekke's Alternate Proposal for Electoral Reform 2022-01-22 Preferential Ridings Proportional (PRP) system

A Case for Inclusion – To begin, simplify the choice.

Yukon's committee previously commissioned a report titled, Options for Yukon's Electoral System, prepared by Dr. Keith Archer and dated October 31, 2021.

This 75-page report presents thorough details on past Yukon elections, electoral system options and their characteristics and challenges on changing electoral systems. Some particularly valuable information was found – examples:

"What are the characteristics of the system that is being offered as an alternative? And, offering many alternatives to voters is a recipe for information overload..... What about the representation of women and minorities, or groups that have been historically under-represented in the legislature?" (pp. 70, 71).

Past unsuccessful electoral reform committees and citizens assemblies have started the electoral change review process with learning about several systems from which to choose. This approach is fraught with confusion and excessive information for the typical voter. In our view, a large amount of taxpayers' time and money has been wasted with these unnecessary processes. These longwinded dialogues divide and confuse community.

Dave Brekke's Proposal puts the importance of community involvement in decision making at the forefront.

PROPOSAL: To establish a Citizen's Assembly to focus the electoral change process by contrasting Dave Brekke's proven effective mixed-member proportional system, similar to New Zealand's, with the Yukon's present first-past-the-post system. Our team has developed a ballot for the Yukon voter to test. We feel that this ballot could be tested by the Citizen's Assembly through many virtual events like mock-elections.

We also feel it is important that Yukon's next two elections should be

carried out with the new ballot, as part of its adoption. This more simple and effective process will improve Yukon's electoral system by engaging the community with a tangible ballot that gives representation to their votes – encouragement to vote. Improvements can be made in future.

Background

Attached to this proposal are 3 documents that outline how Mr. Brekke became concerned about the First-Past-the-Post system, a possible ballot, analysis of how the MMP aspect of the Preferential Ridings Proportional (PRP) system that he is proposing would have affected the 2016 territorial election, and a series of electoral maps and graphs to illustrate the concepts of his system.

Mr. Brekke has an extensive body of research supporting this work that he has yet to publish. Our hope is that this Special Committee will be able to help this 83-year-old long-time type 1 brittle diabetic publish and share his 16-year effort on electoral reform in the Yukon.

Example benefits of the PRP system:

Contrasted data for the two systems from Yukon's 2016 election shows that inclusion, empowerment, and representation of voters went from 45% using the present FPTP system to 95% using his proposed PRP system.

The PRP system was developed with the assistance of many Yukoners and other interested voters. Party lists are not needed. PRP is basically an MMP system with a simple to mark and count preferential vote – second choice only. With PRP, it is possible for all voters to take their concerns to an MLA / MP whom their vote helped to elect.

With PRP, minority governments that require collaborative governance (working together) are almost assured. Elected representatives will be the candidates chosen ahead of another candidate the most times. Only one point-based vote count is required and would be made electronically like Whitehorse elections. The PRP system allows the candidate with the least first choice votes to be elected, being the candidate connected to the most voters. In

other preferential systems, such a candidate is the first to be eliminated.

Under Canada's present electoral system only the votes cast for the riding winners are represented in the legislature. Under the PRP system, almost all votes are represented, encouraging voter turnout. Also, the proposed system maintains the aspect of elections that Canada's present FPTP system is very effective at: connecting voters to candidates and political parties before elections - a very valuable aspect for an electoral system to have.

International Examples

The PRP system is basically very similar to the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) systems in New Zealand, Scotland, Norway, Denmark, and many other countries.

In their elections, voters are almost certain that their votes will be represented.

Minority governments that require collaborative governance are almost assured.

Before changing their voting system in 1996, New Zealand's history was very similar to Canada's. Now New Zealand is a positively engaged democracy.

Political parties with different perspectives all belong to and work together for the New Zealand people. Scotland has seen similar results and even has a permanent Citizens Assembly that Parliament consults when public feedback is needed.

PRP System Details

PRP pairs ridings (constituencies) to result in approximately the same number of riding seats as proportional seats. Almost always, no additional seats are required. For comparison of election results, data can be used directly, without the need to estimate results as in many systems.

NOTE: When applying the PRP system, Canada would require three additional seats to effectively represent voters in the northern third of Canada. At this time, it is difficult to justify those seats, but looking

forward, Northern Canada's population will justify those seats in the not-too-distant future.

No more additional seats would be required in Canada. When used, the PRP system will have an additional second choice on the ballot.

That second-choice vote can give representation to the votes of the 5% of voters not included or represented under the MMP system. Currently, we are not aware of another proportional electoral system that effectively connects voters to candidates like FPTP and has a way to give possible representation to 100% of the voters.

Recent Discussions with Special Committee Member: In late 2021, Special Committee on Electoral Reform member, Minister John Streiker and Dave Brekke met privately to discuss this proposal. At that time, Minister Streiker raised a question and proposed a solution that appears very effective to Mr. Brekke. "What if a party received 75% of the popular vote in a paired-riding electoral area with 4 seats and the party had no candidates to fill the proportional seat?"

Minister Streiker's solution: "Have political parties run two candidates in each paired riding. The candidate with the highest percent of votes would win the party seat in question."

When a proportional seat is won by a party, the connected same party candidates have the satisfaction of their votes being represented.

A Citizens' Assembly would be the best way to tackle these types of questions and discussions.

Conclusion

Learning about several proportional systems from which to choose can be an overwhelming process. We are confident that simplifying the electoral reform process by just comparing the two systems would be more effective and satisfying. Future mprovements can be made. The descriptions of the various systems would be valuable for reference for the Citizen's Assembly, but simply too complicated to be effective for choosing a system.

Thank you for attending to this important issue, and we look forward to Mr. Brekke presenting his submission before a Citizen's Assembly.

Respectfully,

Dave Brekke, retired Yukon teacher, school principal, school counsellor, former Federal Returning Officer and former member of the North Yukon Planning Commission.

Sally Wright, artist, filmmaker, former political candidate 2016 YT Election.

Jean-Paul Pinard, PhD, PEng, husband of former political candidate, Concerned Yukoner.

To: Special Committee on Electoral Reform, Yukon.

Dave Brekke's Alternate Proposal for Electoral Reform 2022-01-22 Preferential Ridings Proportional (PRP) system

Dear Special Committee on Electoral Reform Members,

We are submitting Dave Brekke's Proposal today as a team who have been helping and learning from Mr. Brekke and the wider Fair Vote Yukon group since 2012.

A Case for Inclusion – Simplify the Choice

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Past unsuccessful electoral reform committees and citizens assemblies have started the electoral change review process with learning about several systems from which to choose. This approach is fraught with confusion and excessive information for the typical voter. In our view, a large amount of taxpayers' time and money has been wasted with these unnecessary processes. These long-winded dialogues divide and confuse community.

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We also feel it is important that Yukon's next two elections should be carried out with the new ballot, as part of its adoption. This more simple and effective process will improve Yukon's electoral system by engaging the community with a tangible ballot that gives representation to their votes. Let us experiment. Improvements can be made in future.

Background Attached to this proposal are 3 documents that outline how Mr. Brekke became concerned about First-Past-the-Post system, a possible ballot, analysis of how the MMP aspect of the Preferential Ridings Proportional (PRP) system that he is proposing would have affected the 2016 territorial election, Canada's most recent false majority, and a series of electoral maps and graphs to illustrate the concepts of his system.

Mr. Brekke has an extensive body of research supporting this work that he has yet to publish. Our hope is that this Special Committee will be able to help this 83-year-old brittle diabetic publish and share his 16-year effort on electoral reform in the Yukon.

Benefits of the PRP System

For example, contrasted data for the two systems from Yukon's 2016 election shows that inclusion, empowerment, and representation of voters went from 45% using the present FPTP system to 95% using his proposed PRP system.

The PRP system was developed with the assistance of many Yukoners and other interested voters. PRP is basically an MMP system with a simple to mark and count preferential vote. With PRP, it is possible for **all voters** to take their concerns to an MLA/MP who was helped to be elected by their vote.

With PRP, minority governments that require collaborative governance (working together) are almost assured. Elected representatives will be the candidate chosen ahead of another candidate the most times. Only one vote count is required and would be made electronically like Whitehorse elections.

The PRP system can allow the candidate with the least first choice votes to be elected, being the candidate connected to the most voters. In the other preferential systems such a candidate is the first to be eliminated.

Under Canada's present electoral system only the votes cast for the riding winners are represented in the legislature. Under the proposed system, almost all votes are represented, encouraging voter turnout and engagement in democracy. Also, the proposed system maintains the aspect of elections that Canada's present FPTP system is very effective at: connecting voters to candidates and political parties before elections – a very valuable aspect for an electoral system to have.

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- 1. A candidate can win their riding seat with their own votes by being chosen the most times ahead of another riding candidate.
- 2. A candidate can win a proportional seat with the additional party votes of the other same party candidates. To win, the candidate would have had the highest proportion of points in their riding compared to the other same party candidates. The other same party candidates who did not win the seat would have the satisfaction of their votes helping to elect a same party candidate. Under the FPTP system, only the votes of the winning riding candidates are represented.

NOTE: When applying the PRP system, Canada would require three additional seats to effectively represent voters in the northern third of Canada. At this time, it is difficult to justify those seats, but looking forward, Northern Canada's population will justify those seats in the not-too-distant future.

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Thank you for attending to this important issue, and we look forward to Mr. Brekke presenting his submission more fully before a Citizen's Assembly.

Respectfully,

Dave Brekke, former Yukon teacher, principal, school counsellor, Yukon Federal Returning Officer, and member of North Yukon Planning Commission.

Sally Wright, artist, filmmaker, former political candidate 2016 YT Election.

Jean-Paul Pinard, PhD, PEng, husband of former political candidate, Concerned Yukoner.

How I Became Concerned About Canada's Electoral System

How many people today think like I did before 2005? Awareness is so important to life.

As you may know, in 2004-2005 Canada's Government acted on the growing concern about the dropping number of voters in elections. It responded by calling for proposals to increase voter turnout throughout Canada. Government wanted apolitical evaluation for funding of the proposals, so it became the responsibility of Elections Canada (EC) who decided to have grassroots involvement. Eighteen Returning Officers (RO) from across Canada were brought together to do the evaluations.

Being the longest serving RO in northern Canada and having served on previous election reviews, I was called in to serve on that project.

At the first meeting, just after introductions, one RO stood up and angrily said, "What are we looking at this *&^%\$# stuff for? Why aren't we looking at our voting system?" I was shocked and found it hard to believe that anyone could question Canada's electoral system. Canada is such a wonderful country, and the candidate with the most votes wins the seat and the party with the most votes becomes Government.

That RO's comment was followed immediately by an EC official stating "That's a political statement! That comment cannot even be recorded, let alone discussed." It was in the evenings that I learned about how Canada's system works and could be much more inclusive, yet there was no perfect system. The rarely asked question was "Is my vote going to count?". Over time I felt very uncomfortable with my response that I used to feel comfortable with, "I can't promise that your vote will count, but I do promise that your vote will be counted."

My resignation was accepted after validating the vote in Canada's 2006 election. I thought that there must be an effective combination system that voters would like. I started asking people what they thought was important in an electoral system, and over the years with considerable help, I think that I now have a very inclusive system that could help build community rather than divide community as Canada's present system does.

Nicole Edwards wrote a song, DO YOU WANT YOUR VOTE TO COUNT? https://youtu.be/OFduzUbv4ZE

Yours truly,

Dave Brekke, Very concerned former Federal Returning Officer for Yukon

Edited part 2 of 2022 01 22 submission

Attached are the comparative results of Yukon's 2016 General Election.

The present First-Past-The-Post system resulted in a majority government with far less than half the votes cast. Less than half the votes cast were represented. Government had 100% power - Collaborative governance not required.

The Preferential Ridings Proportional system would have resulted in a minority government.

Almost all votes cast would have been represented. Government, with less than half the seats, would have been required to work collaboratively (cooperatively). Please accept this invitation to see how PRP works.

Looking forward,

Dave Brekke, former Yukon teacher, principal, school counsellor, returning officer, and member of Returning Officers Advisory Committee and North Yukon Planning Commission


2016 Yukon General Election Results for Whitehorse Area

Political Party

		Yukon Party	Liberal	New Democratic	Ind / YFN / Green
Popular Vote of Area		31.64% Value of 1	40.54%	27.15%	0.67%
		Seat	10.00%	1,095	votes
UNDER CANADA'S PRE	SENT	First-Past-The	-Post (FPT	P) Electoral	System
Total seats in the Area:	10	1	7	2	0
% vote power in Area		10.00%	70.00%	20.00%	0.00%
Effective voters in the area out of a total	of:				
	voters	435	3,156	1,092	-
•					
тс	TAL Eff	fective <u>voters</u> :		42.78%	4,683 of voters
UNDER PROPOSED Prefer	ential-	Ridings-Propo	ortional (PF		System
				ŕ	
Total seats in the Area: % vote power of area:	10	3	4	3	0. 00%
Effective voters		30%	40%	30%	0.00%
in the area out of a total	of:				
10,946	voters	3,284	4,378	2,972	-
TO	TAL Eff	fective <i>voters</i> :			10,634
тс	TAL Eff	fective <u>voters</u> :		<u>97.15%</u>	10,634 of voters
HOW PROPORTIO			TERMINE		of voters
			ETERMINEI		of voters
HOW PROPORTIO	NAL S	EATS ARE DE		O UNDER PR	of voters
HOW PROPORTION # Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats	NAL S	EATS ARE DE 1 10.00%	3 30.00%	1 10.00%	of <i>voters</i> P 0 0.00%
HOW PROPORTION # Paired-riding seats	NAL S	EATS ARE DE 1 10.00%	3 30.00%	O UNDER PR	of <i>voters</i> P 0 0.00%
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remaining	NAL S 5	EATS ARE DE 1 10.00% Popular vote m	3 30.00% inus percent	1 10.00% value of Paired-	of voters P 0 0.00% riding seats
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# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remaining for Additional proportional seats Fully supported proportional seats Percentage remaining for partially supported seats.	5 5 5 5 4	1 10.00% Popular vote m 21.64% 2 Previous value n 1.64%	3 30.00% inus percent 10.54% 1 minus percent 0.54%	To UNDER PR 1 10.00% value of Paired-17.15% 1 value of propor 7.15% 1	of voters P 0 0.00% riding seats 0.67% 0 rtional seats 0.67%
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remaining for Additional proportional seats Fully supported proportional seats Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats	5 5 5 5 4	1 10.00% Popular vote m 21.64% 2 Previous value m 1.64%	3 30.00% inus percent 10.54% 1 minus percent 0.54%	To UNDER PR 1 10.00% value of Paired-17.15% 1 value of propor 7.15% 1	of voters P 0 0.00% riding seats 0.67% 0 rtional seats 0.67%
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remaining for Additional proportional seats Fully supported proportional seats Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats Total percent of unrepresented	5 5 5 5 4	1 10.00% Popular vote m 21.64% 2 Previous value n 1.64% 0 Previous value n	3 30.00% inus percent 10.54% 1 minus percent 0.54% 0 minus percent	To UNDER PR 1 10.00% value of Paired-17.15% 1 value of propor 7.15% 1 value of propor 1.15%	of voters P 0 0.00% riding seats 0.67% 0 rtional seats 0.67% 0
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remaining for Additional proportional seats Fully supported proportional seats Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats Total percent of unrepresented First -choice votes	5 5 4 1 10	1 10.00% Popular vote m 21.64% 2 Previous value m 1.64% 0 Previous value m 1.64%	3 30.00% inus percent 10.54% 1 minus percent 0.54% 0 minus percent 0.54%	D UNDER PR 1 10.00% value of Paired-17.15% 1 value of propor 7.15% 1 value of propor 0.00%	of voters P 0 0.00% riding seats 0.67% 0 rtional seats 0.67% 0 rtional seats

Elections Yukon Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Yukon on the 2016 General Election https://electionsyukon.ca/sites/elections/files/english website 2016 election report 1.56.55 pm.pdf

NEW COMBINATION ELECTORAL SYSTEM



See addendum for 2016 Yukon results

COLLABORATION: the key to BETTER GOVERNANCE & The BALLOT that could help it happen in Yukon's future elections

Proportional Representation Ballot with Second Choice Vote

- Mark 1 by your first-choice Candidate
- Mark 2 by your second-choice Candidate
- Mark 1 by your choice of Party for Government

CANDIDAT NAMES	Έ	CHOICE	POINTS	PARTY	CHOICE	POINTS
Helen	Α			Party A		
Dick	В			Party B		
Jane	С	2	1	Party C		
Robert	D	1	2	Party D	1	1
Josephene				Independent		

An EXAMPLE of PREFERENTIAL PROPORTIONAL BALLOT for CHANGE

More choices could be added for future elections 2022 09 11

Offers all party Candidates two ways to win a seat:

1) own votes' points or 2) with additional points of same party candidates' votes

Each seat is won by the candidate with the highest percentage of points in the candidate's riding (constituency) (When understood, points for times chosen ahead of another candidate instead of '2' and '1' points). The winner could be the candidate with the least 1st choice votes – the most wanted and/or accepted candidate. Only one count is needed to elect the winner. This Mixed-Member-Proportional (MMP) system has increased vote representation under the present First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system from less than 50% to over 90%. This could reach 100% with second choice votes. In Yukon's 2016 election, 54% of ballots cast were not represented under FPTP. If you like this ballot and think that it could enliven change to more truly representative democracy with minority governments that require collaboration, see what a friend thinks of the ballot.

Respectfully,


Dave Brekke, genuinely concerned former Yukon Returning Officer

Majority Governments don't need Opposition votes! Would your MLA like her/his votes in the House meaningfully valued, whether in Opposition or Government?

Enlightening book: **TEARDOWN DEMOCRACY Rebuilding from the Ground Up** by

More info: electoralchange.ca Dave Meslin

If Canadians like Inclusion and Collaboration, Why not improve the electoral system, the first step in democracy?




Effective Voters are voters who can point to someone their vote helped to elect.


Under this Alternate System, candidates have two ways to win a seat. Candidates can win riding seats through preferential voting. If not, with so far unrepresented proportional votes in their electoral area, the most popular party candidates can win proportional seats.


When voting is inclusive, false (illusory) majority governments don't happen. In their place, are inclusive minority governments that require collaboration.


Canadians can have Inclusion and Collaboration by improving their electoral system



System Comparison of Yukon's Total 2016 Election Results: Above - vote effectiveness; Below - elected seats







Further

The proposed (alternate) system used in this comparison of electoral system results is the Preferential Ridings Proportional (PRP) system.

Candidates representing a political party have two ways that they can win a seat:

- 1. A candidate can win their riding seat with their own votes' points (Future: by being chosen the most times ahead of another riding candidate).
- 2. A candidate can win a proportional seat with the additional party votes of the other same party candidates. To win, the candidate would have had the highest proportion of points in their riding compared to the other same party candidates.

The other same party candidates who did not win the seat would have the satisfaction of their votes helping to elect a same party candidate. Under the present FPTP system, only the votes of the winning riding candidates are represented (Usually less than half the votes cast).

To facilitate connection between voters and their elected representative, proportional seats are determined in **ELECTORAL AREAS** with between 4 and 10 representatives. In each electoral area, half the seats represent ridings and half the seats represent the entire electoral area, being proportional seats.

Under PRP, the Yukon would be composed of 3 "Electoral Areas"

South East 2 riding seats and 2 proportional seats
Whitehorse 5 riding seats and 5 proportional seats
North West 2 ridingseats, 2 proportional seats and the 1 Vuntut
Gwitchin limited riding seat (Not elligible to win a proportional seat)

The previous and following graphs show the summary and electoral area results. The graphs are followed by the details of how the PRP system would have worked in each electoral area.

Comparisons of other elections and other Canadian geographic areas can be found at:

http://electoralchange.ca/more-info/

Yukon 2016 Election

	Political Party							
		Yukon Party	Liberal	New Democratic	Ind / YFN / Green			
Popular Vote		6,272	7,404	4,927	183			
		33.39%	39.41%	26.23%	0.97%			
Value of 1 Se	at 5.26%	989 votes						
UNDER CANADA'S PRESENT FPTP ELECTORAL SYSTEM								
Total Seats in the Area:	19	6	11	2	0			
Seats Under Present Syste	m	31.58%	57.89%	10.53%	0.00%			
Effective vote	ers							
in the area out of a	total of:							
18,786	voters	2,359	4,625	1,092	0			
TOTAL Effective Voters: 8,076								
				42.99%	of voters			
UNDER THE PROPOSED PRP ELECTORAL SYSTEM								
Total seats in the Area:	19	6	8	5	0			
Seats With Proposed Syste	em	31.58%	42.11%	26.32%	0.00%			
Effective vote	ers							
in the area out of a	total of:							
18,786	voters	5,601	7,059	4,688	0			

TOTAL Effective <u>voters</u>:

17,348

of **voters**

92.34%

UNDER PROPOSED PRP SYSTEM FOR YUKON

THREE ELECTORAL AREAS AND THEIR PAIRED-RIDINGS +

I South Centre and East Yukon Area

Two Paired-riding seats plus Two Proportional seats Mount Lorne - Southern Lakes and Copperbelt South Pelly-Nisutlin and Watson Lake


II Whitehorse Area


Five Paired-riding seats plus Five Proportional seats
Riverdale South and Riverdale North
Copperbelt North and Whitehorse West
Porter Creek North and Porter Creek Centre
Porter Creek South and Takhini - Copper King
Whitehorse Centre and Mountain View

III West and North Yukon Area

Two Paired-riding seats plus Two Proportional seats Kluane and Lake Laberge

Klondike and Mayo-Tatchun PLUS Party Votes from Vuntut Gwitchin for Proportional Seats





SOUTHEAST YUKON ELECTORAL AREA

Effective Voters
Under the Present System


38.7%


61.3%


Voted for Riding Winner


Voted for Another Candidate

Effective voters are
Voters who can point to someone
their vote helped to elect.









2016 Election

SOUTHEAST YUKON	Political Party							
		Yukon Party	Liberal	New Democratic	Ind / YFN / Green			
Popular Vote of Area		34.36%	32.48%	31.27%	1.89%			
Value of 1 Seat	25%	955 votes						
UNDER CANADA'S PRESENT FPTP ELECTORAL SYSTEM								
Total seats in the Area:	4	3	1	0	0			
		75%	25%	0%	0%			
Effective voters in the area out of a tot	tal of							
	voters	1,028	451	_	_			
0,010	101013	1,020	431					
	TOTA	L Effective voters:			1,479			
				38.74%	of voters			
UNDER	THE PR	OPOSED PRP ELE	CTORAL S	YSTEM				
Total seats in the Area:	4	2	1	1	0			
		50%	25%	25%	0%			
Effective voters								
in the area out of a tol								
3,818	voters	1,312	955	955	-			
TOTAL Effective votors: 2.2								
	TOTA	L Effective voters:			3.221			
	TOTA	L Effective voters:		84.36%	3,221 of voters			
HOW F			RE DETERN		· ·			
HOW F		L Effective voters:	RE DETERN		-			
HOW F			RE DETERN 0		· ·			
	PROPOF	RTIONAL SEATS AF		MINED	of voters			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats	PROPOF 2	RTIONAL SEATS AF 2 50%	0 0%	MINED 0 0%	of voters 0 0%			
# Paired-riding seats	PROPOF 2 ining	RTIONAL SEATS AF	0 0%	MINED 0 0%	of voters 0 0%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote rema for Additional proportional se	PROPOF 2 ining eats	RTIONAL SEATS AF 2 50% Popular vote minu -15.64%	0 0% s percent valu 32.48%	O 0% ne of Paired-ridi 31.27%	of voters 0 0% Ing seats 1.89%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote rema	PROPOF 2 ining eats seats	RTIONAL SEATS AF 2 50% Popular vote minu	0 0% s percent valu	MINED 0 0% de of Paired-ridi	of voters 0 0%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote rema for Additional proportional se Fully supported proportional se	PROPOF 2 ining eats	RTIONAL SEATS AF 2 50% Popular vote minu -15.64%	0 0% s percent valu 32.48% 1	O 0% The of Paired-ridi 31.27%	of <i>voters</i> 0 0% ing seats 1.89%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote rema for Additional proportional se Fully supported proportional se Percentage remaining for	PROPOF 2 ining eats seats	Previous value minu	0 0% s percent valu 32.48% 1 us percent val	0 0% ne of Paired-ridi 31.27% 1 ue of proportio	of voters 0 0% ing seats 1.89% 0			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote rema for Additional proportional se Fully supported proportional se	PROPOF 2 ining eats seats	RTIONAL SEATS AF 2 50% Popular vote minu -15.64%	0 0% s percent valu 32.48% 1	O 0% The of Paired-ridi 31.27%	of voters 0 0% ing seats 1.89%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote rema for Additional proportional se Fully supported proportional se Percentage remaining for	PROPOF 2 ining eats seats	Previous value minu	0 0% s percent valu 32.48% 1 us percent val	0 0% ne of Paired-ridi 31.27% 1 ue of proportio	of voters 0 0% ing seats 1.89% 0			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote rema for Additional proportional se Fully supported proportional se Percentage remaining for partially supported seats.	PROPOF 2 ining eats seats 2	Previous value minu -15.64%	0 0% s percent valu 32.48% 1 us percent val 7.48%	O 0% The of Paired-ridit 31.27% 1 The of proportion 6.27% 0	of voters 0 0% ing seats 1.89% 0 onal seats 1.89%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote rema for Additional proportional se Fully supported proportional se Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats	PROPOF 2 ining eats seats 2	Popular vote minu -15.64% 0 Previous value minu -15.64%	0 0% s percent valu 32.48% 1 us percent val 7.48%	O 0% The of Paired-ridit 31.27% 1 The of proportion 6.27% 0	of voters 0 0% ing seats 1.89% 0 onal seats 1.89%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote rema for Additional proportional se Fully supported proportional se Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats Total percent of unrepresente First -choice votes	PROPOR 2 ining eats seats 2 0	Previous value minu -15.64% 0 Previous value minu -15.64% 0 Previous value minu -0.00%	0 0% s percent valu 32.48% 1 us percent val 7.48% ous percent val 7.48%	0 0% The of Paired-riding 31.27% 1 The of proportion 6.27% 0 The of proportion 6.27%	of <i>voters</i> 0 0% ing seats 1.89% 0 onal seats 1.89%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote rema for Additional proportional se Fully supported proportional se Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats Total percent of unrepresented	PROPOF 2 ining eats seats 2	Previous value minu -15.64% O Previous value minu -15.64% O Previous value minu -15.64%	0 0% s percent valu 32.48% 1 us percent val 7.48% 0 us percent val	0 0% The of Paired-riding 31.27% 1 The of proportion 6.27% 0 The of proportion of the proportion	of voters 0 0% ing seats 1.89% 0 onal seats 1.89%			

NORTHWEST YUKON ELECTORAL AREA

Effective Voters
Under the Present System


47.6%


52.4%


Voted for Riding Winner


Voted for Another Candidate

Effective voters are
Voters who can point to someone
their vote helped to elect.









2016 Election

NORTHWEST YUKON		2016 Election	Political Par	+ v/				
plus Vuntut Gwichin			Fontical Fai	New	Ind / YFN /			
plus vulleut Gwieliili		Yukon Party	Liberal	Democratic	Green			
Popular Vote of Area		37.22%	42.91%	18.92%	0.94%			
Value of 1 Seat(PRPP)	25% 1	,006 votes						
Value of 1 Seat(FPTP)	20%	804 votes						
UNDER CANADA'S PRESENT FPTP ELECTORAL SYSTEM								
Total seats in the Area:	5	2	3	0	0			
		40%	60%	0%	0%			
Effective voters								
in the area out of a tota								
4,022 v	oters	896	1,018	-	-			
	TOTAL F	ffective voters:			1,914			
	101712			47.59%	of voters			
				11100,0	0.1000			
UNDER T	THE PRO	POSED PRP ELE	CTORAL SY	YSTEM				
Total PRP seats in Area:	4	1	2	1	0			
plus Vuntut Gwichin	5	25%	50%	25%	0%			
Effective voters		2070	33,0	2070	• 70			
in the area out of a tota	ıl of:							
	oters	1,006	1,726	761	-			
,		•	,					
		3,493						
				86.83%	of voters			
HOW D	DODODT	IONAL OFATO AF	oe petebi		of voters			
HOW P	ROPORT	IONAL SEATS AF	RE DETERM		of voters			
HOW P # Paired-riding seats	ROPORT	IONAL SEATS AF	RE DETERM		of voters			
				IINED				
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats	2	1 25%	1 25%	0 0%	0 0%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain	2 iing	1 25% Popular vote minus	1 25% s percent value	I INED 0 0% e of Paired-ridir	0 0% ng seats			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats	2 iing	1 25%	1 25%	0 0%	0 0%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional sea	2 iing ts	1 25% Popular vote minus 12.22%	1 25% s percent value 17.91%	O 0% e of Paired-ridir 18.92%	0 0% ng seats 0.94%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain	2 iing ts	1 25% Popular vote minus	1 25% s percent value	I INED 0 0% e of Paired-ridir	0 0% ng seats			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional sea	2 iing ts	1 25% Popular vote minus 12.22%	1 25% s percent value 17.91% 0	O 0% e of Paired-ridir 18.92%	0 0% ng seats 0.94%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional seaffully supported seaffully supported seaffully supported seaffully supported seaffully seaffully supported seaffully seaffu	2 iing ts	1 25% Popular vote minus 12.22% 0	1 25% s percent value 17.91% 0	O 0% e of Paired-ridir 18.92%	0 0% ng seats 0.94%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional seath Fully supported proportional seath Percentage remaining for partially supported seats.	2 ning ts eats 0	1 25% Popular vote minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minu 12.22%	1 25% s percent value 17.91% 0 us percent value 17.91%	O 0% e of Paired-ridin 18.92% O ue of proportion 18.92%	0 0% ng seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional seaf Fully supported proportional seaf Percentage remaining for	2 iing ts	1 25% Popular vote minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minu	1 25% s percent value 17.91% 0 us percent valu	O 0% of Paired-ridin 18.92% 0	0 0% ng seats 0.94% 0 nal seats			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional seat Fully supported proportional seat Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats	2 sing ts eats 0	1 25% Popular vote minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minu 12.22%	1 25% s percent value 17.91% 0 us percent valu 17.91%	O 0% e of Paired-ridir 18.92% ue of proportion 18.92%	0 0% ng seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional seat Fully supported proportional seat Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats Total percent of unrepresented	2 sing ts eats 0	Popular vote minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus	1 25% s percent value 17.91% 0 us percent valu 17.91% 1 us percent valu	O O% of Paired-ridin 18.92% Oue of proportion 18.92% 1 ue of proportion	0 0% ng seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional seat Fully supported proportional seat Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats	2 sing ts eats 0	1 25% Popular vote minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minu 12.22%	1 25% s percent value 17.91% 0 us percent valu 17.91%	O 0% e of Paired-ridir 18.92% ue of proportion 18.92%	0 0% ng seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional seat Fully supported proportional seat Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats Total percent of unrepresented	2 sing ts eats 0	Popular vote minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus	1 25% s percent value 17.91% 0 us percent valu 17.91% 1 us percent valu	O O% of Paired-ridin 18.92% Oue of proportion 18.92% 1 ue of proportion	0 0% ng seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional seat Fully supported proportional seat Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats Total percent of unrepresented First -choice votes	2 iing ts eats 0	Popular vote minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus 12.22%	1 25% s percent value 17.91% us percent value 17.91% 1 us percent value 0.00%	O 0% e of Paired-ridin 18.92% 0 ue of proportion 18.92% 1 ue of proportion 0.00%	0 0% ng seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94% 0			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional seat Fully supported proportional seats Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats Total percent of unrepresented First -choice votes Total Paired Seats	2 iing ts eats 0	Popular vote minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus 12.22% 12.22%	1 25% s percent value 17.91% 0 us percent value 17.91% 1 us percent value 0.00%	O 0% e of Paired-ridin 18.92% 0 ue of proportion 18.92% 1 ue of proportion 0.00%	0 0% ng seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional seat Fully supported proportional seat Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats Total percent of unrepresented First -choice votes	2 sing ts eats 0	Popular vote minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus 12.22%	1 25% s percent value 17.91% 0 us percent value 17.91% 1 us percent value 0.00%	O 0% e of Paired-ridin 18.92% 0 ue of proportion 18.92% 1 ue of proportion 0.00%	0 0% ng seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94% 0			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional seat Fully supported proportional seat Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats Total percent of unrepresented First -choice votes Total Paired Seats Vuntut Gwitchin Seat	2 ing ts eats 0	Popular vote minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus 12.22% 1 25% 0	1 25% s percent value 17.91% 0 us percent value 17.91% 1 us percent value 0.00% 2 50% 1	O 0% e of Paired-ridin 18.92% 0 ue of proportion 18.92% 1 ue of proportion 0.00% 1 25% 0	0 0% Ing seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94% 0 0%			
# Paired-riding seats % Rep Value of Riding Seats Percent of popular vote remain for Additional proportional seat Fully supported proportional seats Percentage remaining for partially supported seats. Partially supported seats Total percent of unrepresented First -choice votes Total Paired Seats	2 sing ts eats 0	Popular vote minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus 12.22% 0 Previous value minus 12.22% 12.22%	1 25% s percent value 17.91% 0 us percent value 17.91% 1 us percent value 0.00%	O 0% e of Paired-ridin 18.92% 0 ue of proportion 18.92% 1 ue of proportion 0.00%	0 0% ng seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94% 0 nal seats 0.94%			

WHITEHORSE ELECTORAL AREA

Effective Voters
Under the Present System


42.8%


57.2%


Voted for Riding Winner


Voted for Another Candidate

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Voters who can point to someone
their vote helped to elect.









2016 Yukon General Election Results

Political Party

	Political Party					
			Yukon Party	Liberal	New Democratic	Ind / YFN / Green
Popular Vote of Area			31.64%	40.54%	27.15%	0.67%
	Vā	alue of 1 Sea	t	10.00%	1,095	votes
UNDER CANADA'S I	PRESENT	Γ FPTP EX	CLUSIVI	E ELECT	ORAL SYST	ЕМ
Total seats in the Area	10		1	7	2	0
% vote power of Area Effective voters	1 of:		10.00%	70.00%	20.00%	0.00%
in the area out of a tota 10,946 vot			435	3,156	1,092	
10,546 VO	ters		455	3,130	1,092	-
Т	OTAL Eff	ective <u>vot</u>	<u>ers</u> :		42 7 9 %	4,683 of voters
					42.70 /0	OI VOIEIS
UNDER THE PRO	POSED I	PRP INCL	JSIVE EI	LECTORA	AL SYSTEM	
Total seats in the Area:	10		3	4	3	0
% voting power of are	_		30.00%	40.00%	30.00%	0.00%
Effective voters				10100,0	00.0076	010070
in the area out of a tota	l of:					
10,946 vot	ers		3,284	4,378	2,972	-
T	OTAL Eff	ective <u>vot</u>	ers ·			10,634
•			<u> </u>		97.15%	of voters
Popular Vote	PORTIO	NAL SEAT	1 S ARE L 32%	DETERMI 41%	NED 27%	1%
# Paired-riding seats	5		1	3	1	0
% Rep Value of Riding Seats	3		10.00%	30.00%	10.00%	0.00%
Percent of popular vote remaining	_	Popular vo	•		e of Paired-rid	· ·
for Additional proportional seats			21.64%	10.54%	17.15%	0.67%
Fully supported proportional sea	ts		2	1	1	0
	4					
Percentage remaining for		Previous va	lue minus բ	percent valu	ue of proportio	nal seats
partially supported seats.			1.64%	0.54%	7.15%	0.67%
Partially supported seats	1		0	0	1	0
Total percent of unrepresented		Previous va	lue minus p	percent valu	ue of proportio	nal seats
First -choice votes Total Seats	10		1.64% 3	0.54% 4	0.00%	0.67% 0